On 5 August 2010, the BBC reported that President Felipe Calderon had claimed that the Mexican drug Cartels were ‘seeking to replace the state’.[1] This article will explore whether the powerful, and often violent, Mexican drug Cartels have become terrorist gangs rather than just organised, albeit hugely successful, criminal gangs.
The Cartels - An introduction
Before addressing the key issues, a brief summary of the main Cartels and their geographical areas of influence in the Mexican turf wars will be useful:
The main axis of the modern war is the rivalry between the Sinaloa and Los Zetas cartels. Los Zetas were founded by renegade former special-forces members. Sinaloa is led by the country's most famous kingpin, and one of the ‘world’s most wanted’ - Joaquin El Chapo Guzman. The group is based in the Pacific coast state of the same name whereas Los Zetas control much of the Gulf coast. Both Sinaloa and the Zetas are also present in other parts of the country. One of the most intense recent battles has been for control of the north-eastern border state of Tamaulipas, situated just across the border from Texas
Another cartel involved in the wars is the Carillo Fuentes organisation, based in Ciudad Juarez, just across the border from El Paso in Texas. This group is trying to hold off the Sinaloa Cartel. Here the extreme violence is intertwined with the rivalry between local youth gangs. This reflects the degree of social decomposition and the way the drugs war is spilling over into Mexican society. This, as recently described by a local source working for the Mexican branch of a London academic institution, is a society in a ‘state of civil war’.
Other Cartels are La Familia, located in the state of Michoacan, and the Tijuana Cartel led by Arellano Felix which maintains its bastion around southern San Diego in California. The Beltran Leyva group is currently involved in a bitter internal leadership struggle following the death of its leader in a navy operation last year[2].
The geographical areas of influence of the aforementioned Cartels are shown on the map below[3]:
Definitions
I would now like to consider how one might define the difference between terrorists and criminals. I would suggest that terrorism refers to the use of violence, and/or the threat of violence, to achieve a political or ideological goal, such as to reclaim a State. Criminality, on the other hand, involves the use of violence, or the threat of it, to achieve financial gain. .
The Economic Power of the Cartels
In 2006, President Calderon declared a ‘war on drugs’. By August 2010, over 28,000 people have died as a result of drug-Cartel-related violence in what has become an industry worth $40 billion annually in Mexico alone[4]. Not only does this statistic demonstrate the extent of the problem but it highlights the success of the Cartels’ criminal and financial empire. However, have these Cartels expanded beyond their usual criminal activity and are they now controlling the country or parts of the country in a political sense as suggested by Calderon and reported by the BBC in my opening statement?
The Cartels and Law and Order[5]
On 12 August 2010, the Latin American Herald Tribune reported that Mexican cartels pay corrupt cops ‘$100 million a month’[6]. One police commander was in fact recently arrested for his ties to drug gangs[7]. Not only does the ‘recruitment’ of Mexico’s police force help the Cartels carry on their activities un-molested, in some cases the police actually assist the Cartels in carrying out illicit activities. On 20 August 2010 the BBC reported that six police officers were arrested having reportedly admitted to the kidnapping and murder of a mayor on 14 August[8]. They stated that they had been recruited by a Cartel to carry out the attack[9].
There have also been various accusations that Mexico’s judges have been infiltrated by the Cartels, a suggestion compounded by the Latin American Herald Tribune report that ‘42 judges were sanctioned for various irregularities in the past 3½ years’. This was corroborated by the Associated Press (AP), who reported that the ‘judicial void’ is the key reason for the Cartels’ continued success in a society in which they themselves ‘decide who gets arrested’. The AP report also stated that fewer than 25% of Cartel members who were charged with an offence actually get convicted[10].
The Cartels and the Media
The Cartels’ attempts to infiltrate and control Mexico’s media are also apparent. Televisa, with various branches around Mexico, is the largest media group in Latin America outside Brazil and has become the focus of the Cartels’ recent attention. As Stratfor reported on 16 August 2010, the Televisa TV network has the largest viewing audience in Mexico, ‘shaping the perception of millions of....citizens. This degree of influence makes [it] an obvious target as criminal groups seek to manipulate the coverage of organised crime-related incidents’[11]. On 26 July 2010 the Sinaloa cartel kidnapped a Televisa news crew. The Cartel tried to force the crew to broadcast prepared messages, photographs and videos before the crew was rescued by Federal State Police five days later.
On 15 August 2010 Los Zetas members used grenades and rocket launchers to attack various Televisa offices around the country. In addition, as recently as early August 2010, Reuters described how Mexico’s drug Cartels have now resorted to posting ‘gory videos’ of their treatment of informers and rival gang members on YouTube. The aim is to ‘spread fear’ among the population[12]. In this sense they are employing a similar tactic to certain jihadist terrorist groups whose on-line video propaganda is well known. However, in the case of Mexico’s drug Cartels, these gory videos seem to be less a case of political activism and more an example of an attempt to instil fear in order to further their drug trafficking activities.
The Cartels’ Links to Separatist Terrorist Groups
Latin America is renowned for its revolutionary separatist groups, one of the most significant of which is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). As well as being widely acknowledged as a politically motivated terrorist group, FARC is also known to be heavily involved in drug-trafficking. In early 2010 Bloomberg reported that FARC earned in excess of $1 billion in 2009 by selling cocaine to the Mexican cartels who act as a conduit between FARC and its large customer base in the US.
If FARC is sharing its narcotic supply with the Mexican Cartels, it might not be beyond reason to assume that the two groups are also sharing weaponry, tactics and intelligence.
Although the Cartels have not thus far publicly aligned themselves to any particular ideological or political cause, it is possible that they may fall under the political and ideological influence of FARC in the future.
The Cartels and the Development of ‘Micro-States’
President Calderon has stated that Mexico’s most prominent Cartels are now successfully taxing local businesses. They are also using violent means to impose ‘their own law’[13] on society.
This is more or less an admission of the fact that the Cartels have now established micro-states within Mexico. However it is also important to acknowledge that these micro-states have been established for the sole purpose of increasing narcotics sales, rather than to foment ideological or political revolution.
The Cartels and the Future
On 11 August 2010, AP reported that President Calderon was considering revising his strategy and focussing on controlling some of the Cartels ‘indirect’ activities[14], as well as perhaps legalising certain drugs. In view of the alarming death rates and continuing success of the Cartels’ activities since Calderon proposed a zero-tolerance policy in 2006, it seems clear that something needs to change. Based on Calderon’s comment of 11 August suggesting a shift on strategy on the war on drugs, perhaps some of those ‘indirect activities’ I describe above will become the focus of the government’s attention rather than the narcotic supply itself.
As I’ve shown, the Mexican cartels already have links with FARC and it is plausible that in the future they may well adopt a similar ideological and political standpoint. If this were to occur, Calderon’s government must consider the possibility that the Cartels might then expand their activities to mirror some of those of FARC. These might include targeting the national infrastructure for attack, including the power and energy-supply networks, as well as lobbying for political change and recruiting the local population.
On the other hand, FARC’s history is rooted in political ideology rather than in criminal economic gain and here-lies the important distinction between the groups.
Conclusion
Although Calderon has stated that the Cartels are seeking to replace the state, I would suggest that what he actually means is that the Cartels are operating micro-states. But because they are not politically or ideologically motivated, they are probably not intending to occupy the whole of Mexico in a political sense. It is true that politically motivated terrorist groups inevitably end up getting involved in criminal activity, as has been the case with FARC, Al Qaeda and many other groups. However it is not necessarily the case that a criminal group will always move into the ideological and political sphere.
For the Mexican public, particularly those people who have been directly and often tragically affected by the drug Cartels, the question of whether these Cartels are criminal or terrorist gangs is probably irrelevant. However, at an analytical level, it is clear that the country’s drug-Cartels are now involved in activities that go well beyond those associated with organised criminal gangs. As I have shown, they have often been successful in undermining the state, for instance by infiltrating the police and the judiciary, and in this sense they do certainly appear to be running micro-states.
Despite all this, and despite the fact that some of their current strategy replicates that of certain global terrorist groups, I still believe that the cartels’ activities are ultimately driven purely by the desire for financial gain. As long as this remains their motivation, the Cartels should continue to be regarded as organised criminal gangs rather than as terrorists.
However, in my opinion, the Cartels’ relationships and transactions with other Latin-American separatist groups, such as FARC, is certainly something that should be closely monitored in the future.
[1] The BBC online, Calderon: Mexico
[2] The Guardian Newspaper, ‘Mexico
[3] The BBC online, Bodies Hung from bridge in Cuernavaca Mexico, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11054730, 23 August 2010
[4] Reuters, Mexico Drug Cartels Use Gory Videos to Spread Fear, 5 Aug 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6734E720100805
[5] Latin American Herald Tribune, 42 Mexican Judges Sanctioned Since 2007, 12 August 2010, http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=362739&CategoryId=14091
[6] Latin American Herald Tribune , Mexico
[7] Aljazeera.net, Corrupt Police in Mexico War, 9 August 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/video/americas/2010/08/20108932015873971.html
[8] BBC News, Police Held over Mexical Mayor Edelmiro Cavadoz killing, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11044141, 20 August 2010
[9] 20 August 2010 - The cartel in question has not yet been named
[10] Associated Press: In Mexico Justice Means Catch and Release, 27 July 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38432505/ns/world_news-americas/
[11] Stratfor Global Intelligence, Mexico
[12] Reuters, Mexico Drug Cartels Use Gory Videos to Spread Fear, 5 Aug 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6734E720100805
[13] The BBC online, Calderon: Mexico
[14] Associated Press, 11 Aug 2010, Mexican President Open to Change in Drug Strategy, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/lt_drug_war_mexico
